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Summary: 
The Kyoto Protocol incorporates emissions trading, joint implementation and the 
clean development mechanism to help Annex 1 countries to meet their Kyoto 
targets at a lower overall cost. Using a global model based on the marginal 
abatement costs of 12 countries and regions, this paper estimates the 
contributions of the three Kyoto flexibility mechanisms to meet the total 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions required of Annex 1 countries under the 
three trading scenarios respectively. Our results clearly demonstrate that the 
fewer the restrictions on the use of flexibility mechanisms the gains from their use 
are greater. The gains are unevenly distributed, however, with Annex 1 countries 
that have the highest autarkic marginal abatement costs tending to benefit the 
most. Our results also indicate that restrictions on the use of flexibility 
mechanisms not only reduce potential of the Annex 1 countries’ efficiency gains, 
but also are not beneficial to developing countries because they restrict the total 
financial flows to developing countries under the clean development mechanism. 
JEL classifications: Q28; Q25; Q48; Q43 
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1 Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), agreed in December 1997, Kyoto, is the first international 
environmental agreement that sets legally binding emissions targets for a basket of 
six greenhouse gases and timetables for Annex 1 countries (i.e., the OECD 
countries and countries with economies in transition). Together, Annex 1 countries 
must reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases by 5.2% below 1990 levels 
over the commitment period 2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 1997). Reflecting the 
underlying principle of the UNFCCC, which states “policies and measures to deal 
with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost”, the Kyoto Protocol incorporates a variety of provisions for 
flexibility mechanisms through which the costs of abating emissions can be 
lowered. Article 6 authorizes the transfer or acquisition of “emission reduction 
units” from joint implementation (JI) projects among Annex 1 Parties. Article 12 
establishes the so-called “clean development mechanism” (CDM). Through the 
mechanism, Annex 1 countries will be able to obtain the certified emission 
reductions from clean development projects jointly implemented with non-Annex 
1 countries (i.e., developing countries), and use them to count towards meeting 
their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. In addition to the two project-based 
mechanisms, the Kyoto Protocol accepts the concept of emissions trading in 
principle, under which one Annex B (an annex to the Kyoto Protocol that lists the 
quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment per Party) country or its 
sub-national entities would be allowed to purchase the rights to emit greenhouse 
gases (GHG) from other Annex B countries or their regulated entities that are able 
to cut GHG emissions below their assigned amounts or their targets. Currently, 
international climate change negotiations are finalizing the rules, procedures and 
institutions needed to make these flexibility mechanisms fully operational. 
To what extent Annex 1 countries’ compliance costs can be lowered depends on 
the extent to which the flexibility mechanisms will be allowed to contribute to 
meet their Kyoto targets. Under the Kyoto Protocol, each of the Articles defining 
the three flexibility mechanisms carries wording that the use of the mechanism 
must be supplemental to domestic actions. Whether the supplementarity clauses 
will be translated into a concrete ceiling, and if so, how should a concrete ceiling 
on the use of the three flexible mechanisms be defined remain to be determined. 
At the June 1999 Sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC, the EU 
(European Union, 1999) has tabled a proposal for concrete ceilings on the use of 
flexibility mechanisms. The EU proposal calls for the limits on both buying 
countries and selling countries. For a buying country, the maximum purchase for 
GHG emission reduction units via all three flexible mechanisms can not exceed 
the higher of the following two alternatives: 
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(1) 5% of {(its base year emissions multiplied by 5 + its assigned amount)/2}; 
(2) 50% of the difference between its annual actual emissions in any year 
between 1994 and 2002, multiplied by 5, and its assigned amount. 
The EU proposal is based on quantities already agreed upon or emissions that will 
be observed before the proposed restriction becomes applicable (Ellerman and 
Wing, 2000). The difference between the two alternatives is that the first is based 
mainly on the Kyoto Protocol’s quantified emission limitation or reduction 
commitments, whereas the second takes the actual emission reduction efforts of 
buying countries as its basis. One reason behind the two alternatives is that 
industrialized countries whose emissions are already very high on a per capita 
basis should take the lead in reducing their own emissions so that developing 
countries are encouraged to follow suit and take on emissions commits at a later 
date. Another reason has been to urge Annex 1 countries to stimulate technical 
innovation domestically by raising marginal abatement costs of buying countries, 
although it is unclear to what extent a stimulus of increased technical innovation 
in buying countries would remain. Motivated by alleviating the concern about hot 
air, the EU proposal also sets the rule for a selling country. Similar to the first 
alternative for a buying country, the EU proposal specifies that the maximum 
allowed sale for GHG emission reduction units via all three flexible mechanisms 
can not exceed the amount calculated by: 5% of {(its base year emissions 
multiplied by 5 + its assigned amount)/2}, referred to hereafter as Alternative 1. 
This proposed restriction on transfers provides an indirect way of implementing 
supplementarity since the higher market price as a result of the restriction on the 
amount of hot air for sale restricts the acquisitions from what would otherwise 
have occurred. 
Under the EU proposal, “however, the ceiling on net acquisitions and on net 
transfers can be increased to the extent that an Annex B Party achieves emission 
reductions larger than the relevant ceiling in the commitment period through 
domestic action undertaken after 1993, if demonstrated by the Party in a verifiable 
manner and subject to the expert review process to be developed under Article 8 
of the Kyoto Protocol.” (European Union, 1999). This is the so-called however 
clause. It allows an importing (exporting) country to purchase (sell) more than the 
amount defined by the above alternatives if verifiable domestic abatement by the 
importing (exporting) country can be demonstrated. Thus, the however clause 
effectively raises the importing ceiling and allows an importing country to 
purchase emission reductions from abroad up to 50% of the emission reduction 
requirement, provided that the country can verify a similar volume of domestic 
abatement undertaken after 1993. 
Given the emissions reductions required of Annex 1 countries, part of the needed 
reductions will take place domestically, whereas the rest will come from emissions 
trading and JI with other Annex 1 countries, and acquisitions of the certified CDM 
credits from non-Annex 1 countries. Using a global model based on marginal 
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abatement costs of 12 countries and regions, this paper aims to examine the 
implications of the differing extent of use of these flexibility mechanisms for both 
Annex 1 countries and non-Annex 1 countries as well as for the market price of 
permits under the no limits scenario, under the EU ceilings with the however 
clause scenario, and under the no hot air scenario. Section 2 describes the 12-
region’s marginal abatement cost-based model used in determining the division of 
abatement actions at home and abroad. Section 3 discusses the data used. Section 
4 presents the results. Finally, Section 5 draws up the main conclusions. 
In writing the paper, we have taken a balanced approach combining the 
calculations with policy analysis in order to put the numbers into perspective and 
thus facilitate the understanding of what the numbers say. Wherever necessary we 
have compared our estimates with those from a variety of economic modelling 
studies. Although not aimed to provide a completely rigorous explanation for the 
differences between these estimates, such a comparison will indicate the range of 
such estimates and identify the sources of the differences, thus providing the broad 
perspective on the issues examined. 
2 The Global Model Based on Marginal Abatement 
Costs of 12 Countries and Regions 
Given the emissions reductions required of Annex 1 countries, part of the needed 
reductions will take place domestically, whereas the rest will come from emissions 
trading and JI with other Annex 1 countries, and acquisitions of the certified CDM 
credits from non-Annex 1 countries. The relative differential between the marginal 
cost of domestic abatement and the international price of emissions permits would 
apportion the total emissions reductions into domestic reductions and the demand 
for GHG offsets. Thus, in order to divide up abatement actions at home and 
abroad, we need to determine the marginal abatement costs for all the countries. 
Because it is a daunting task to estimate the marginal abatement cost for each 
individual country, we do so at a regional level. We divide the world into twelve 
regions. The acronyms for the twelve regions are given in Table 1. The first six 
regions are Annex 1 regions, whereas the other six are non-Annex 1 regions 
whose emissions are unconstrained under the Kyoto Protocol. In defining these 
regions, we have attempted to employ the minimal level of disaggregation 
necessary for the purpose of this study. 
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Table 1: Definitions of Countries and Regions. 
Annex 1 countries and regions Non-Annex 1 countries and regions 
1.  US: United States 
2.  JP: Japan 
3.  EU: European Union 
4.  OOE: Other OECD Countries 
5.  EE: Eastern Europe 
6.  FSU: Former Soviet Union 
7. 
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
EEX: Energy Exporting Countries 
CN: China 
IN: India 
DAE: Dynamic Asian Economies 
BR: Brazil 
ROW: Rest of the World 
 
Now let us describe the model for determining the division of abatement actions at 
home and abroad. To start with, we assume that the marginal abatement cost 
function for region i is of the quadratic form: 
2
i i i i iMCA a Q b Q= +  
where MCAi is the marginal cost of domestic abatement for region i, Qi is the 
amount of greenhouse gas abatement undertaken domestically in million tons of 
carbon, and ai and bi are coefficients. By integration, the total cost of domestic 
abatement, TCDi, is: 
2 3
0
1 1( ) 3 2
iQ
i i i i i i i i i iTCD a q b q dq a Q b Q= + = × + ×∫ 2   for  every  i. (1) 
Denoting the total emissions reductions required of the Kyoto-constrained Annex 
1 region i by Di and the amount of hot air that is allocated to region i by Hi, the 
total autarkic abatement cost, that is, the total abatement cost in the absence of 
emissions trading (i.e., in the no trading case), TCAi, is calculated as 
2 3
0
1 1( ) ( ) (3 2
i iD H
i i i i i i i i i i iTCA a q b q dq a D H b D H
−
= + = × − + × −∫ 2)i
and meets the remaining demand (Di - Qi - Hi) via purchasing the “right to emit” at 
the international price p. So, the total remaining demand of all purchasing regions, 
TD, is: 
 (2) 
 for i = US, JP, EU, OOE, EE. 
Emissions trading helps a region with high autarkic marginal cost to lower its 
compliance cost by avoiding the undertaking of more costly domestic actions. In 
this case, the region undertakes domestic abatement Qi (Qi < Di) at the marginal 
cost 
2
i i i i ia Q b Q MCA+ =   for i = US, JP, EU, OOE, EE, (3) 
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( )i i i
i
TD D Q H= − −∑     i = US, JP, EU, OOE, EE. (4) 
Measured as percentages of the total a
trading, the reductions in a
batement costs in the absence of emissions 
batement costs for purchasing region i is: 
( )( )i i i i i
i
i
G
TCA
=     i = US, JP, EU, OOE, EE (5) TCA TCD p D Q H− + − −
where Gi is the gains from emissions tradi
hand, for the Kyoto-unconstrained regio
trading provides an incentive for it to undertake otherwise no domestic abatement 
t of emissions permits available for sale, TS, are: 
    i 
of which, the valu r permits to the 
Annex 1 region
    i = EEX, CN, IN, DAE, BR, ROW. (8) 
Subtracting their own abatement costs, the net value of the CDM market, or the 
net gain of non-Anne
    i = EEX, CN, IN, DAE, BR, ROW. (9) 
At the equilibrium, the total amount of demand for emissions permits are equal to 
the total supply so that we hav
ng for purchasing region i. On the other 
n with lower marginal cost, emissions 
actions and sell the permits generated to those higher cost regions at the 
international price p 
2
i i i ia Q b Q p+ =     for i = FSU, EEX, CN, IN, DAE, BR, ROW. (6) 
Thus, the total amoun
i
i
TS Q= ∑ = FSU, EEX, CN, IN, DAE, BR, ROW, (7) 
e of the total non-Annex 1 countries’ sales fo
s, that is, the value of the CDM market, VCDM, is: 
i
i
VCDM pQ= ∑
x 1 regions, NCDM, is derived as 
( )i iNCDM pQ TCD= −∑
i
e 
i
i
H TS TD+ =∑     i = US, JP, EU,OOE, EE, FSU. (10) 
This completes the summarized description of the general model. When it is used 
to examine the following cases, some specific settings are involved. 
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• Case A. No Limits Scenario 
Even if no limits are imposed on the use of flexibility mechanisms, it is still in the 
interest of a purchasing country to abate its own emissions up to the point where 
the marginal cost of doing so is equal to the prevailing price of permits. Thus, Eq. 
(3) merges with Eq. (6) so that we have 
2
i i i i ia Q b Q MCA p+ = =     for every i. (11) 
This implies that the marginal cost of domestic abatement for each region is the 
same and that there is no distinction between the international price and domestic 
prices. 
• Case B. Supplementarity Restrictions Scenarios 
When a uniform formula defining the restrictions on the use of flexibility 
mechanisms is applied to all the regions, some regions might be allowed to 
purchase more than needed. Put another way, it is more costly for the regions to 
purchase part of the allowed acquisitions than to abate them domestically. To 
remove the unnecessary part, we set Eq. (3) into 
2
i i i i ia Q b Q MCA p+ = ≥     for i = US, JP, EU, OOE, EE. (12) 
As a result, a region is going to purchase permits only if it becomes more costly to 
undertake emissions abatement on its own. By contrast, for a region that is 
allowed to meet part of its commitments via the purchase of emissions permits, it 
must rely on domestic abatement capabilities. The lesser extent it is allowed to 
purchase permits abroad, the higher the domestic prices, and hence the larger the 
distinction between the international price and domestic prices. 
• Case C. No Hot Air Scenario 
Under no hot air scenario, trading in hot air is not allowed. Thus, Eq. (10) 
becomes 
.  (13) TS TD=
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3 Data 
To run the above model, we first need the aggregate magnitude of emissions 
reductions required of each Annex 1 region and the size of hot air in 2010. The 
former represents the amount of the mandated reductions from projected business-
as-usual (BAU) emissions levels, whereas the latter represents those assigned 
amounts under the Kyoto Protocol that exceed anticipated emissions requirements 
even in the absence of any limitation. The two types of data are derived from the 
individual national communications (to the UNFCCC) of the following 35 Annex 
1 countries with emissions targets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia Federation, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. This involves three steps. The first step is to determine GHG 
emissions for each Annex 1 country in the base year. The second step is to 
determine the Kyoto target for each Annex 1 country in 2010. The third step is to 
estimate baseline GHG emissions for each Annex 1 country in 2010. By adding up 
the amount of the mandated reductions from projected baseline emissions levels 
for each Annex 1 country, the aggregate magnitude of emissions reductions 
required of Annex 1 countries in 2010 is estimated to be 620.6 million tons of 
carbon (MtC) equivalent, as given in Table 2. Similarly, the size of hot air in 2010 
is calculated to be 105.0 MtC.1 See Zhang (1999) for detailed discussion on 
procedures and results. 
Table 2: Annex 1 Regions’ Emissions Reductions Required and the Size of           
Hot Air in 2010. 
Annex 1 regions Emissions reductions required 
in 2010 (MtC) 
The size of hot air in 
2010 (MtC) 
United States 
Japan 
European Union 
Other OECD Countries 
Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet Union 
Annex 1 Total 
423.9 
71.2 
40.6 
57.3 
27.6 
- 
620.6 
0 
0 
12.7 
0 
10.9 
81.4 
105.0 
Source: Zhang (1999). 
                                                          
1 Note that in some regions there is the co-existence of hot air and the required 
emissions reductions within the same region. This is simply because of the sums 
across countries within each of these regions. For an individual Annex 1 country, it is 
either required to reduce its emissions to meet the Kyoto targets or not required if it 
has hot air. 
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The second set of data are the maximum allowed acquisitions and the maximum 
allowed transfers in 2010. Applying the two EU ceiling alternatives to each Annex 
1 country, and assuming that countries would wish to use the higher allowed 
acquisitions in 2010, we have calculated the maximum allowed acquisitions in 
2010 for those Annex 1 countries whose emissions targets in 2010 are below their 
projected BAU emissions (as given in Table 3) without considering the however 
clause. When the however clause is factored in, the above ceilings on the allowed 
acquisitions are relaxed up to 50% of the difference between projected baseline 
emissions and the Kyoto targets in 2010. Following the same procedure as one in 
calculating the maximum allowed acquisitions, we have calculated the maximum 
allowed transfers in 2010 for those Annex 1 countries whose emissions targets in 
2010 are above their projected BAU emissions. See Zhang (1999) for detailed 
discussion on procedures and results. 
Table 3: Allowed Acquisitions and Transfers of GHG Emission Reduction Units 
Under the Two EU Ceiling Alternatives. 
Annex 1 regions Maximum allowed acquisitions 
in 2010 without considering the 
however clause (MtC) 
Maximum allowed 
transfers in 2010 
(MtC) 
United States 
Japan 
European Union 
Other OECD Countries 
Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet Union 
Annex 1 Total 
136.8 
31.6 
56.4 
23.3 
14.1 
- 
261.9 
- 
- 
10.9 
- 
4.4 
54.9 
70.2 
Source: Zhang (1999). 
The third set of data are coefficients of the marginal abatement cost function for 
each of the above twelve regions. They are taken from Ellerman and Decaux 
(1998) who have estimated the marginal abatement cost (at 1985 US$ per ton of 
carbon) functions for the above twelve regions running the Emissions Prediction 
and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model under progressively stringent carbon 
constraints for the year 2010 and then econometricaly estimating the EPPA runs 
for the amount of abated carbon emissions and the corresponding marginal 
abatement costs. The results are given in Table 4. It can be seen that the assumed 
cost functions fit very well to the results from the EPPA runs because R2 is very 
close to one.  
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Table 4: Coefficients of the Marginal Abatement Cost Functions of the 
Form: i
2
i i i iMCA a Q b Q= + . 
Region ai bi R2 
USA 
JPN 
EEC 
OOE 
EET 
FSU 
EEX 
CHN 
IND 
DAE 
BRA 
ROW 
0.0005 
0.0155 
0.0024 
0.0085 
0.0079 
0.0023 
0.0032 
0.00007 
0.0015 
0.0047 
0.5612 
0.0021 
0.0398 
1.8160 
0.1503 
-0.0986 
0.0486 
0.0042 
0.3029 
0.0239 
0.0787 
0.3774 
8.4974 
0.0805 
0.9923 
0.9938 
0.9951 
0.9981 
0.9973 
0.9938 
0.9983 
0.9992 
0.9970 
0.9996 
0.9997 
0.9967 
Source: Ellerman and Decaux (1998). 
4  The Economic Effects of the Three Trading 
Schemes in 2010 
How the total emissions reductions required of Annex 1 countries will be met 
depends on the extent to which the flexibility mechanisms will be allowed to 
contribute to meet their Kyoto targets. This is the area that remains to be decided 
by the climate change negotiators. For the purpose of illustration, we examine 
three trading scenarios here. 
• No limits scenario: no caps are imposed on the use of all three flexibility 
mechanisms so that one Annex 1 country can trade as much as it wished until 
it becomes more costly for the country to trade than to abate domestically; 
• The EU ceilings with the however clause scenario: just as the name implies, 
the scenario follows the EU proposal for concrete ceilings on the use of all 
three flexibility mechanisms, as discussed in Section 1. For an importing 
country, the maximum acquisitions from all three flexibility mechanisms are 
allowed up to 50% of the difference between projected baseline emissions and 
the Kyoto targets in 2010, provided that the country can verify a similar 
volume of domestic abatement undertaken after 1993. We simply assume that 
such a verification is possible without incurring significant transaction costs. 
On the export side, we assume that unconstrained countries (those with hot 
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air) would be limited to exporting only the amount of hot air, which is defined 
by the alternative 1 under the EU proposal; and 
• No hot air scenario: trading in hot air is not allowed, indicating that any 
effectuated trading in GHG emissions must represent ‘real’ emissions 
reductions. 
Under the above three scenarios, trading of emissions permits is assumed to take 
place globally among all the countries. But, under the Kyoto Protocol non-Annex 
1 countries currently have no obligations to reduce their GHG emissions. Thus, in 
our modelling exercises, these countries are treated as if they agreed to constrain 
their emissions in such a manner that they are allocated permits equal to their 
projected baseline emissions. As such, non-Annex 1 countries only reduce their 
emissions by an amount equal to the number of permits they wish to sell. 
Following the definition of the certified credits from CDM projects, the amount of 
emissions reductions below the country-wide baseline trend is termed as the 
supply of the certified CDM credits from each non-Annex 1 countries.2 
4.1 Contributions of the Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms 
For countries whose emissions targets specified under the Kyoto Protocol are 
expected to exceed their anticipated emissions requirements even in the absence of 
any limitation, Section 3 indicates that these countries in 2010 will have surplus 
assigned amounts of 105.0 MtC available for sale. Because hot air is available at 
zero abatement cost, hot air is assumed to be used to the maximum extent allowed, 
except for under the no hot air scenario. This means that, of the aggregate demand 
of 620.6 MtC in 2010, hot air contributes to 105.0 MtC under the no limits 
scenario, and to 70.2 MtC under the EU ceilings with the however clause scenario. 
Then, the remaining demand will be met via domestic abatement actions and three 
flexibility mechanisms. 
Inserting the aggregate magnitude of emissions reductions required and the size of 
hot air in 2010, the maximum allowed acquisitions and the maximum allowed 
transfers in 2010, and the estimated coefficients of the marginal abatement cost 
function for each of the above twelve regions, we solve the 12-region’s marginal 
abatement cost-based model for determining the division of abatement actions at 
                                                          
2  This implies that in our modelling exercises we treat the CDM synonymously with 
emissions trading as many other modellers do (Weyant, 1999). In real practice, the 
CDM is a project-based mechanism. Unlike homogenous permits under emissions 
trading, concerns about additionality and the inherent difficulty of establishing 
counterfactual baselines for heterogeneous CDM projects and monitoring emissions 
reductions below the baselines may impose high transaction costs and thereby limit 
the supply of CDM credits from non-Annex 1 countries (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; 
US Administration, 1998). 
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home and abroad using GAMS, a widely distributed nonlinear programming 
package (Brooke et al, 1996). 
According to our calculations, even if no limits are imposed on the use of all three 
flexibility mechanisms, not all the emissions reductions required of an Annex 1 
country will take place abroad. This is because even if no account is taken of 
ancillary benefits of reducing GHG emissions, it is still in the interest of any 
buying country to reduce its own emissions as long as the marginal costs of doing 
so are lower than the prevailing prices of permits. Based on the marginal costs of 
domestic abatement for the twelve regions, it is estimated that a reduction of 171.7 
MtC, or 27.7% of the total needed emissions reductions in 2010 will be met 
through domestic actions of Annex 1 countries under the no limits scenario (see 
Table 5). This is broadly in line with the finding of the IPCC (1996) that reducing 
emissions by 20% from 1990 levels in developed countries within the next two or 
three decades can be achieved domestically through no-regrets options. When 
trading in hot air is not allowed, the international price of permits increases in 
comparison with the no limits scenario (see Table 6). As a result, the demand for 
permits abroad decreases, and more and more domestic abatement is undertaken. 
This is confirmed in Table 5, which indicates that a reduction of 203.5 MtC, or 
32.8% of the total needed emissions reductions in 2010 will be met through 
domestic actions of Annex 1 countries under the no hot air scenario. Under the EU 
ceilings with the however clause scenario, the amount of abatement through 
domestic actions in 2010 is estimated to be 315.4 MtC, or 50.8% of the total 
emissions reductions required of Annex 1 countries in 2010. The reason why the 
Annex 1 countries as a whole abate slightly over 50% domestically under this EU 
ceiling scenario is that Eastern Europe abates 68.7% domestically (Zhang, 2001). 
This in turn is because its low marginal abatement cost allows it to benefit from 
exporting permits up to the extent that its domestic abatement cost equals the 
international price of permits. 
Table 5: The Contributions of Three Flexibility Mechanisms Under the Three 
Trading Scenarios in 2010 (MtC). 
Scenarios 
 
Domestic 
actions 
Hot air 
 
Emissions 
trading and JI 
CDM Total 
supply 
No limits 
EU ceilings with  
  the however clause 
No hot air 
171.7 
 
315.4 
203.5 
105.0 
 
70.2 
0 
51.8 
 
39.6 
59.6 
292.1 
 
195.4 
357.5 
620.6 
 
620.6 
620.6 
 
Table 5 summarizes estimates of the contributions of three flexibility mechanisms 
under the three trading scenarios. It can be seen that the supply of certified CDM 
credits in 2010 ranges from 195.4 MtC under the EU ceilings with the however 
clause scenario to 292.1 MtC under the no limits scenario and to 357.5 MtC under 
the no hot air scenario, respectively. In comparison with the no limits scenario, the 
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EU ceilings with the however clause restriction would reduce the size of the CDM 
market by 33.1%. Although such a restriction is much relaxed in terms of its 
impact on the size of the CDM market, in comparison with the EU ceilings 
without the however clause scenario under which the size of the CDM market is 
cut by 54.9% (Zhang, 2001), its impact on the size of the CDM market is still very 
severe. Of the total emissions reductions required of Annex 1 countries in 2010, 
the supply of the certified CDM credits accounts for 31.5% under the EU ceilings 
with the however clause scenario, 47.1% under the no limits scenario, and 57.6% 
under the no hot air scenario, respectively. 
Table 6: Autarkic Marginal Abatement Costs in the No Trading Case, and Domestic 
Prices and the International Prices of Permits in 2010 Under the Three 
Trading Scenarios (at 1998 US$ per ton of carbon). 
Scenarios United 
States 
Japan European 
Union 
Other 
OECD 
International 
price 
No emissions trading 
No limits 
EU ceilings with  
  the however clause 
No hot air 
160.1 
9.6 
 
46.3 
12.6 
311.8 
9.6 
 
126.4 
12.6 
9.1 
9.6 
 
6.1 
12.6 
33.4 
9.6 
 
6.2 
12.6 
- 
9.6 
 
5.6 
12.6 
 
When there are no limits imposed on the use of flexibility mechanisms, the 
marginal cost of domestic abatement for each region equalizes, and there is no 
distinction between the international price and domestic prices. Based on the 
model, the international price of permits in 2010 is calculated to be US$ 9.6 per 
ton of carbon. This price is pushed up to US$ 12.6 per ton when trading in hot air 
is not allowed. The increase in the international price is partly because any sales 
for permits by the former Soviet Union are generated by no cost-free abatement 
undertaken to earn export permits additional to the amount of hot air, and partly 
because preventing trading in hot air increases the OECD countries’ demand for 
the certified CDM credits. When the supplementarity restriction as specified under 
the EU proposal is imposed on the acquisitions, the purchases of permits are 
restricted. This will push down the market price. Thus, the international price of 
permits is much lower under the EU ceilings with the however clause scenario 
than under the no limits scenario. Moreover, because no account is taken of the 
differences in the marginal costs of domestic abatement among the Annex 1 
countries, all the countries are required to comply with the same supplementarity 
rule. This could lead to a distinction between the international price of permits and 
domestic prices of buying countries. The lesser extent it is allowed to purchase 
permits abroad, the higher the domestic prices, and hence the larger the distinction 
between the international price and domestic prices. As indicated in Table 6, 
because the autarkic marginal abatement cost for Japan is highest, the EU 
proposed restriction leads to the largest differential between the domestic price in 
Japan and the international price of permits. On the other hand, because the 
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official projections of baseline GHG emissions in 2010 by most EU member 
countries are very close to their targets, the EU only needs to purchase a vey small 
amount of permits to meet its targets.3 As a result, the supplementarity restriction 
examined here on the EU is much less severe than on Japan and the US. 
Consequently, domestic price for the EU is very close to the international price of 
permits. 
Because autarkic marginal abatement costs for the OECD countries excluding the 
EU are much higher than the market price of permits, trading can help these 
countries to lower their compliance costs by avoiding their undertaking of more 
costly domestic actions. The extent to which the compliance costs can be lowered 
depends on the relative differential between the autarkic marginal cost of the 
country in question and the international price of emissions permits. In percentage 
terms, the countries whose autarkic marginal costs are much higher than the 
market price will benefit more than those countries whose autarkic marginal costs 
are closer to the market price. As indicated in Table 7, because Japan and the US 
have the highest autarkic marginal abatement costs, the two countries benefit the 
most from trading both under the no limits scenario and under the no hot air 
scenario. Measured as percentages of the total abatement costs in the no trading 
case, the abatement costs of Japan and the US are cut by 93.1% and 85.2% under 
the no limits scenario, and 91.0% and 81.0% under the no hot air scenario, 
respectively. By contrast, because the autarkic marginal cost for the EU is very 
close to the market price, it achieves only small gains from trading under the 
above two scenarios. Besides, the restriction on the use of flexibility mechanisms 
tends to lower the gain from trading. For the OECD as a whole, the reduction in 
abatement costs, namely, the gain from emissions trading, decreases from 86.5% 
under the no limits scenario to 78.4% under the EU ceilings with the however 
clause scenario. 
Table 7: The Reductions in the Total Abatement Costs in 2010 Under the Three 
Trading Scenarios (%). 
Scenarios United 
States 
Japan European 
Union 
Other 
OECD 
OECD 
No limits 
EU ceilings with 
  the however clause 
No hot air 
85.2 
 
79.8 
81.0 
93.1 
 
76.5 
91.0 
0.2 
 
16.3 
2.3 
45.3 
 
63.9 
33.5 
86.5 
 
78.4 
82.4 
                                                          
3 The low EU baseline projections are attributable in large part to internal burden 
sharing of the Kyoto commitments among the member countries, having incorporated 
the impacts of energy policies that are currently being either implemented or 
negotiated in response to climate change, and to the choice of base year. See Zhang 
(1999, 2001) for detailed discussion. 
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4.2 The Size of the CDM Market and the Shares of China and 
India 
Multiplying the endogenously-determined, international price of permits by the 
supply of certified CDM credits from each non-Annex 1 country and summing 
over all the corresponding product, we can derive the value of the CDM market in 
2010. As indicated in Table 8, our estimate ranges from US$ 1103.4 million under 
the EU ceilings with the however clause scenario to US$ 4512.8 million under the 
no hot air scenario. Subtracting their own abatement costs, the net value of the 
CDM market in 2010, or the net gain of non-Annex 1 countries is estimated to be 
in the range of US$ 603.0 million under the EU ceilings with the however clause 
scenario to US$ 2559.1 million under the no hot air scenario. The finding that the 
net gain of non-Annex 1 countries is highest when trading in hot air is not allowed 
indicates that to prevent trading in hot air, although in practice it is very difficult 
to distinguish real emissions reductions from hot air, is beneficial to the expanding 
of the CDM market as well as to the global climate. With respect to the 
geographical distribution of the CDM flows, because of a great deal of low-cost 
abatement opportunities available in the energy sectors of China and India and 
their sheer sizes of population, the two countries are expected to emerge as the 
dominant host countries of CDM projects. This is confirmed in Table 8, which 
shows that about three-quarters of the total CDM flows go to China and India, 
respectively. Because of relatively high abatement costs and relatively small size, 
the remaining four non-Annex 1 regions account for only 25% of the total flows 
channelled to developing countries through the CDM. 
Table 8: The Value of the CDM Market and the Shares of China and India in 2010 
Under the Three Trading Scenarios. 
 No 
limits 
EU ceilings without 
the however clause 
No hot air 
CDM market (million US$) 
of which: 
     China 
     India 
 
Net CDM market (million US$) 
of which: 
     China 
     India  
2795.6 
 
60.3% 
15.1% 
 
1565.0 
 
59.9% 
15.5% 
1103.4 
 
60.0% 
15.5% 
 
603.0 
 
59.6% 
16.0% 
4512.8 
 
60.4% 
14.9% 
 
2559.1 
 
60.1% 
15.3% 
 
Because the CDM has an important role in helping Annex 1 countries to meet 
their Kyoto targets at a lower overall cost, some studies have estimated the 
potential size of the CDM market. As indicated in Table 9, these estimates vary. 
Assuming the contributions from domestic abatement actions and hot air and 
dividing the remaining demand between emissions trading and JI among Annex 1 
16 Z. X. Zhang 
countries and the CDM within non-Annex 1 countries in proportion to the 
estimated potential of supply, Haites (1998) estimates that the size of the CDM 
market in 2010 ranges from 265 MtC under 50% reduction from BAU emissions 
scenario (under which the maximum allowed acquisitions from all three flexibility 
mechanisms are limited to 50% of the difference between projected BAU 
emissions and the Kyoto targets in 2010) to 575 MtC under the no limits scenario. 
The size of the market estimated by the four economic modelling studies 
examined ranges from 397 MtC with the OECD GREEN model (Van der 
Mensbrugghe, 1998) to 723 MtC with the EPPA model (Ellerman and Decaux, 
1998). Austin et al. (1998) argue that such estimates derived from these global 
modelling exercises tend to overestimate CDM flows because, in practice, 
political limitations and transaction costs will probably keep CDM activity at the 
lower end of such estimates. Of the studies examined in Table 9, the estimate by 
Vrolijk (1999) is at the low end of the range. In absolute terms, our estimate is at 
the low to middle end. This is mainly because, as indicated in Table 9, our 
estimate of total emissions reductions required of Annex 1 countries, which is 
based on compilation of the national communications from 35 Annex 1 countries, 
is lower than those estimates from economic modelling studies. As discussed in 
Zhang (1999), the main reason is that the official projections of baseline GHG 
emissions in 2010 by most EU member countries are very close to their targets, 
thus leading to low demand for emissions reductions. In percentage terms, our 
estimate of the contribution of the certified CDM credits is broadly in line with 
other estimates. Our upper bound estimate comes from the no hot air scenario. If 
the supply of hot air is included as other estimates from economic modelling 
studies do, then our upper bound estimate will come down to 47.1% under the no 
limits scenario. 
Table 9: Estimates of the Size of the CDM Market in 2010. 
 Size of the CDM 
market (MtC) 
Total emissions reductions 
required of Annex 1 
countries (MtC) 
Contribution of 
the CDM (%) 
EPPA 
Haites 
G-Cubed 
GREEN 
SGM 
Vrolijk 
Our projection 
723 
265-575 
495 
397 
454 
67-141 
195-358 
1312 
1000 
1102 
1298 
1053 
669 
621 
55 
27-58 
45 
31 
43 
10-21 
31-58 
Sources: Edmonds et al. (1998); Ellerman and Decaux (1998); Haites (1998); McKibbin et 
al. (1999); Van der Mensbrugghe (1998); Vrolijk (1999); Zhang (2001). 
 
Can the CDM actually produce the amount of certified credits as we estimate 
here? This is not that easy to answer, but experience with activities implemented 
jointly (AIJ) might give us some indications. The first Conference of the Parties to 
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the UNFCCC in Berlin in April 1995 endorsed a pilot AIJ phase. During the AIJ 
pilot phase, emission reductions achieved are not allowed to be credited to current 
national commitments of investor countries under the UNFCCC. By the time (30 
June 1998) of the UNFCCC’s second synthesis report on AIJ, 95 projects were 
listed as AIJ projects (UNFCCC, 1998). These projects are located in 24 host 
countries, with Africa hosting only one certified AIJ project. If all the projects 
were fully implemented and operating as designed, they would generate a 
combined GHG offset of 162 million tons of  CO2 equivalent, namely, 44 MtC 
equivalent, over an average lifetime of 16.5 years (UNFCCC, 1998). Translated 
into an annual GHG offset, it amounts to 2.7 MtC. By contrast, the projected 
contribution of the certified CDM credits implies as much as a 100-fold increase 
in this type of project-based activities. Although lack of adequate incentives for 
the private sector participation in AIJ project financing limits the role of the AIJ, 
to achieve such a substantial scale of increase in the quantity of emissions 
reductions, although not impossible, poses great institutional challenges for 
developing countries, given that most non-Annex 1 countries have not 
experienced an AIJ project within their own countries.  
5 Conclusions 
The Kyoto Protocol incorporates emissions trading, joint implementation and the 
clean development mechanism to help Annex 1 countries to lower the costs of 
meeting their Kyoto targets. To what extent their compliance costs can be lowered 
depends on the extent to which the flexibility mechanisms will be allowed to 
contribute to meet their Kyoto targets. Taking the year 2010 as representative of 
the first commitment period, and using a global model based on marginal 
abatement costs of 12 countries and regions, this paper estimates how many of the 
emissions reductions required of Annex 1 countries in 2010 will be met through 
domestic abatement actions, emissions trading and JI, and acquisitions of the 
certified CDM credits under the no limits scenario, under the EU ceilings with the 
however clause scenario, and under the no hot air scenario.  
Our results suggest that, of the total emissions reductions required of Annex 1 
countries in 2010, domestic actions account for 27.7% under the no limits 
scenario, 32.8% under the no hot air scenario, and 50.8% under the EU ceilings 
with the however clause scenario. The contributions of the certified CDM credits 
in 2010 are estimated to range from 31.5% under the EU ceilings with the 
however clause scenario to 47.1% under the no limits scenario and to 57.6% under 
the no hot air scenario. In absolute terms, the supply of the certified CDM credits 
in 2010 ranges from 195.4 MtC under the EU ceilings with the however clause 
scenario to 292.1 MtC under the no limits scenario and to 357.5 MtC under the no 
hot air scenario, respectively. Although it is at the low to middle end of those 
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estimates derived from economic modelling studies, our projected contribution of 
the certified CDM credits implies as much as a 100-fold increase in the type of 
project-based activities in comparison with an annual GHG offset through the AIJ 
of 2.7 MtC. No doubt, to achieve such a substantial scale of increase in the 
quantity of emissions reductions, although not impossible, poses great institutional 
challenges for developing countries. With respect to the geographical distribution 
of the CDM flows, we found that China and India account for about three-quarters 
of the total flows channelled to developing countries through the CDM.  
Besides, our results clearly indicate that the use of flexibility mechanisms helps to 
lower the OECD countries’ compliance costs by avoiding their undertaking of 
more costly domestic actions. However, the magnitude of reductions in 
compliance costs differs substantially among the OECD countries. In percentage 
terms, the countries whose autarkic marginal abatement costs are much higher 
than the market price of permits will benefit more than those countries whose 
autarkic marginal abatement costs are closer to the market price. Furthermore, our 
results demonstrate that restrictions on the use of flexibility mechanisms not only 
reduce potential of the Annex 1 countries’ efficiency gains, but also are not 
beneficial to developing countries because they restrict the total financial flows to 
developing countries under the CDM. Thus, from the perspective of husbanding 
the world’s limited resources, the fewer the restrictions on the use of flexibility 
mechanisms the gains from their use are greater. 
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